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Abstract 
Attitudes toward the environment are understood in psychological science as the result of 
separate mental systems, one conscious and the other unconscious, and capable of affecting 
behavior outside of awareness. For example, the common incongruity between what people 
say about global sustainability and what they do about the environment has been explicated by 
the influence of implicit environmental attitudes. This study examined the operational 
adequacy of the commonly used Implicit Association Test (IAT) by directly asking participants 
to report their recognition of behavioral influences whilst performing an IAT. An analytic 
technique of awareness assessment was introduced to improve on traditional post-experimental 
questioning, by requiring a constrained report that provided introspective access to task-related 
knowledge in awareness. Results revealed participants were very aware of their IAT response 
latencies, they accurately recognized IAT features that produced those latencies, and the 
validity of this awareness predicted their test scores, challenging the claim to attitude effects 
of which individuals are unaware. Thus, the critical evaluation showed the IAT method to be 
inadequate as a measure of environmental attitudes that are implicit. Applications of the 
awareness assessment technique are discussed for evaluating tests of implicit cognition, and 
for promoting individual mindfulness of one’s own environmental attitude. 
Keywords: implicit attitudes, environment, IAT, consciousness 
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In the face of overwhelming evidence for global climate change, many individuals remain 
unconcerned in their consumer choice behavior (e.g., Brooks, Oxley, Vedlitz, Zahran, & 
Lindsey, 2014) and their product choices are slow to change (e.g. Weber, 2006). To be sure, 
individuals often express their willingness to make more environ-mentally sustainable choices 
(e.g. Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011) and their agreement with pro-environmental 
attitudes. Beattie and Sale (2009) reported about 70 percent of surveyed individuals expressed 
a preference for low carbon products recognized by carbon footprint information on product 
labels. In addition, the resistance to more sustainable behavior is not attributable to insufficient 
knowledge about climate change (Pidgeon, 2012). The goal of such investigations within 
environmental psychology is to discover the factors that underlie individual resistance to 
sustainable behavior, ultimately to enhance sustainable development and its education. 
 
One account of the incongruity between what some people say and what they do regarding the 
environment is provided by cognitive psychology’s dual-processing metatheory that 
hypothesizes two kinds of social cognitions: explicit conscious attitudes that individuals report 
and implicit attitudes that influence social behavior unconsciously (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This traditional view postulates that explicit and implicit 
mental representations are processed in separate mental systems, the former conscious and 
deliberative and the latter automatic and outside of awareness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Evans, 2008; Kihlstrom, 1987; 1999; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). Accordingly, 
resistance to environmentally sustainable behavior might be explained by the unconscious 
attitudes that individuals harbor towards the environment that both contradict their consciously 
expressed desires toward sustainable development and influence their behavior “invisibly” as 
cognitions outside of awareness. 
 
The question of what cognitions are conscious (explicit) and what are not (implicit) is central to 
all areas of modern psychology. Developments in the area of implicit social cognition (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999; Wilson, et al., 2000) have brought about increasing interest in forms of self-
knowledge that are inaccessible to consciousness, including our implicit social attitudes and the 
automatic effects they have on our thoughts and behaviors (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). Many attitudes have been shown to exert influence outside of 
awareness, including unconscious biases toward racial groups (Berdik, Wax, & Tetlock, 2007; 
Sargent, Kahan, & Mitchell, 2007), political parties (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012), and implicit 
attitudes toward behaviors such as alcohol consumption (e.g., Palfai & Ostafin, 2003). Implicit 
attitudes have been recently suggested as the underlying cause of unconscious pro-
environmental behavior as well (Beattie & McGuire, 2012; 2015). For example, to test the 
effectiveness of product carbon labelling on consumer cognitions, Beattie and McGuire (2015) 
measured eye movements over images of consumer items containing carbon footprint 
information and participants’ explicit attitudes toward environmentally-friendly products. 
Implicit environmental attitudes were also assessed with a version of the ubiquitous implicit 
association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). On each trial of the basic IAT 
paradigm, respondents quickly match evaluative attributes (e.g., pleasant, unpleasant) to target 
items (e.g., spider and flower) under the assumption that response times to match will be fast 
when a target is associated with an attribute relative to trials when the target is not as strongly 
associated (De Houwer, 2002; Greenwald, et al., 1998). Using these measures, Beattie and 
McGuire (2015) reported the characteristic dissociation between implicit and explicit measures 
of attitude toward the environment. Participants’ implicit environmental attitudes, 
operationalized as difference scores on the IAT, were unrelated to self-reported preferences for 
environmentally sustainable products. 
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With respect to the unconscious behavioral impact of implicit attitudes, Beattie and McGuire 
(2015) reported one finding, that participants with positive difference scores on the IAT (pro-
environment implicit attitudes) were more likely to fix their eyes first on the carbon label 
information than other spaces on the product images. The conclusion drawn from this apparent 
pre-conscious motor effect was that carbon labelling may be effective for those consumers 
“with the right implicit attitude” (p. 253). We questioned this interpretation on two 
methodological grounds. First, by presenting product images as the stimulus targets for 
environmental IAT categorizations, the finding may signify the operation of implicit attitudes 
but it remains possible the object of those attitudes so measured was not the global environment 
but rather the particular product images repeated in the stimulus set (Beattie & McGuire, 2015, 
p. 272), or product labelling itself. Second, beyond the null relationship obtained with explicit 
attitudes, no systematic analysis was reported to confirm that the attitudes measured by IAT 
response times were indeed unconscious, making it uncertain whether the IAT measured 
anything fully implicit or truly environmental. Furthermore, no evidence was given for the 
IAT’s suitability to measure implicit cognitions of non-social categories such as consumer 
product sustainability or what pre-conscious eye movements could mean for our understanding 
of environmental psychology beyond the limited test of product label effectiveness. To address 
these concerns severely and shed light on the level of awareness individuals might achieve 
regarding the influence of their own environment-related associative cognitions, we set out to 
examine the operational adequacy of the IAT as a measure of environmental attitudes that are 
implicit. 
 
Researchers of implicit social cognitions and the behaviors they predict often use performance-
based measures (a) to observe the attitudes indirectly by their behavioral influence and (b) to 
avoid the confounding influence of deliberative conscious mental processing (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The implicit status of the predictive 
attitudes is typically confirmed by responses to post-experimental questions that indicate 
participants had no awareness of the experimental manipulation or its influence on their 
behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; see Dulany, 2002 for a critical summary). It is noteworthy 
that such open-ended non-analytic approaches to awareness assessment appear to be driven by 
the theory they are intended to confirm (Dulany, 2003). These assessments often fall short of 
telling what we can know about ourselves (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) because they require as 
evidence a report from awareness that is nothing less than some knowledge of the experimental 
hypothesis, as though participants could guess the researcher’s notions of the criterion of 
awareness of the effects of manipulations. To addresses these concerns in the implicit cognition 
literature, the present evaluation of the environmental IAT contributed an analytic approach to 
awareness assessment. Our technique collected self-reports of conscious contents during test 
that were constrained to simple judgments rather than opened-ended propositional expressions, 
and with varying validity of report, for the detection of participants’ awareness of IAT trial 
features and behavioral influences of different trial types if they exist. 
 
Scores from the IAT typically correlate poorly with explicitly reported attitude scales as theory 
would predict (see Garwonski & Bodehausen, 2006), although the measure’s reliability 
limitations have been shown (e.g. Sargent, et al., 2007). Additional research has brought into 
doubt the automatic and unconscious status of attitudes measured as associations by the IAT 
(Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014; Nosek & Smyth, 2007), providing further motivation to 
critically examine the IAT as a measure of implicit environmental attitudes. Hahn, et al. (2014), 
for example, investigated the assumption that implicit and explicit social attitudes explain 
unique aspects of behavior (Angerström & Rooth, 2011; Dempsey & Mitchell, 2010) by 
demonstrating that individuals are very accurate in predicting, consciously and explicitly, their 
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IAT results. Furthermore, it appears IAT measurements can be deliberately reduced and 
reversed (Blair, 2002; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). These findings would appear troubling for 
the IAT’s continued use as a measure of any implicit cognitions. 
 
The following investigation of whether IAT scores operationalize positive (or negative) 
environmental attitudes that are hypothetically implicit was accomplished by collecting 
directed self-reports that were constrained or focused toward the detection of recognizable 
behavioral influences intended by the theory of the test (Dulany, 2003). We first anticipated 
replication of the statistical dissociation between implicit environmental attitudes measured by 
IAT and participants’ statements of explicit attitude (Beattie & McGuire, 2015). Regarding the 
present study’s salient contribution, the critique of IAT for environmental attitudes, we used 
an analytic conscious report technique to address two empirical questions: (1) Are participants 
aware of their attitude toward the environment as it is evoked on test trials? And, if so, (2) does 
the level of this awareness, indexed by the validity of conscious reports, predict individual 
environmental IAT scores? Valid conscious reports of the impact of IAT trial manipulations, 
their attribution to IAT attitudinal categories, and their reliable prediction of IAT performance 
would contribute serious challenges to the operational value of the IAT as a measure of 





Volunteers were 34 undergraduate students (24 women) attending a private four-year 
university in the US state of Kentucky who received academic credit in their general 
psychology class for participating. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 23.5 years (M = 19.2), 
all were English-speaking and only one self-identified as not White. The data collected from 
all participants were included in the analysis. Prior to the study participants gave their written 
consent to participate, informed by statements of minimal risk, confidentiality, means of data 
protection, and their right to revoke the agreement for any reason, in accordance with the 
university’s human research protections committee and the ethical standards of the American 
Psychological Association. 
 
Measures of Environmental Attitude 
Adapted from Greenwald et al. (1998) and similar to Beattie and McGuire’s (2012) measure, 
the IAT for environmental attitudes was a computerized indirect measure of the relative 
strengths of positive and negative environment-related associations. On each trial the test 
presented one member from one of 10 pairs of exemplar images matched for function and 
pictorial orientation but clearly opposed in their environmental sustainability (e.g. a line of coal 
rail cars and a row of windmills; plastic bag and recycle bin; traditional light bulb and high-
efficiency light bulb). By pressing the “E” or “I” keys on the keyboard, participants categorized 
the images as either environmentally-friendly or environmentally-unfriendly and individual 
evaluative words as either pleasant or unpleasant in meaning. The evaluative words presented 
for categorization in the IAT were: 
 
(1) Pleasant: Joy, Love, Peace, Wonderful, Pleasure, Glorious, Laughter, Happy  
(2) Unpleasant: Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty, Evil, Awful, Failure, Hurt 
 
Each IAT consisted of 5 blocks of categorization trials, with 20 trials in blocks 1, 2, and 4 and 
30 trials in blocks 3 and 5. The first block presented simple categorizations of the exemplar 
images as “Eco-friendly” or “Not eco-friendly.” The second block collected response times for 
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simple categorizations of the words as either “Pleasant” or “Unpleasant.” Starting with the third 
block, a mixture of image and word trials were presented in which both the eco-friendly and 
pleasantness categories remained on the computer screen and were congruently presented 
together, from a pro-environment perspective, on the left or right for response (e.g. Eco-
friendly with Pleasant). A reversal of response sides was presented for only image 
categorizations in the fourth block. In the final fifth block there was again a mixture of image 
and word trials for which the eco-friendliness and pleasantness category labels were 
incongruently presented to the left or right (e.g. Eco-friendly with Unpleasant). Under these 
common IAT arrangements participants who associate environmentally-friendly exemplars 
with “pleasant” and environmentally-unfriendly images with “unpleasant” should respond 
faster on trials in block 3 where the category pairings are Pleasant/Eco-friendly and 
Unpleasant/Not eco-friendly and more slowly on trials in block 5 where the category pairings 
are Pleasant/Not eco-friendly and Unpleasant/Eco-friendly. A score is computed (D-score, 
Greenwald et al., 1998) from block mean reaction times that serves as a measure of the 
individual’s level of positive or negative environmental attitude. 
 
To assess participants’ explicit attitude for this correlational study, participants answered two 
questions on the back of the awareness assessment response sheet. First they wrote a rating 
value on a Likert scale that assessed explicit liking of an environmentally-friendly lifestyle 
from 1 (“I strongly prefer non-sustainable and eco-unfriendly living”) to 5 (“I strongly prefer 
sustainable and eco-friendly living”). The second question was an open-ended statement: 




Participants were invited to complete a “sustainable products test” in groups of five or less on 
desk-top computers in an interactive computer lab on campus. After brief instructions on the 
IAT categorization task, participants began with 20 practice trials that presented each exemplar 
image once for categorization as “Eco-friendly” or “Not eco-friendly” followed by blocks of 
IAT trials for which response times were collected. During testing participants were interrupted 
randomly between trials from one to three times on the critical mixed category trial blocks to 
provide reports from awareness of two types: (a) an estimate of the number of trails over the 
last 10 that seemed difficult, and (b) a rating along a 7-point Likert scale of the amount of 
hesitation on the previous trial. The verbal prompts to elicit these reports were printed, and the 
reports were written, on a separate assessment sheet next to the computer. Upon completion of 
the IAT participants answered questions about their experience and their considered reasons 
why some trials were more difficult than others. Participants took approximately 20 minutes to 




Mean difference scores (D-score) for implicit attitude and scores from the explicit 
environment-friendliness scale revealed the sample was not dissimilar to previous samples in 
which implicit attitude was observed (e.g. Beattie & McGuire, 2012). The mean D-score of 
1.31 (SE = .36) from this environmental IAT and the modal rating value of 4 (M = 4.17, SE 
= .14) from the explicit attitude question (“moderately prefer sustainable consumables”) both 
indicated a similar positive attitude toward the environment in the present sample. Also in 
alignment with previous findings (Beattie & McGuire, 2015), there were 8 participants (23.5%) 
with negative D-scores indicating a cognitive bias away from pro-environment attitudes 
although every one scored their explicit attitude Likert rating as 4 or 5 and confirmed these 
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strong positive environmental attitudes in their open-ended responses. Correlation analysis also 
resulted in a replication of the characteristic null relationship between IAT scores measuring 
implicit attitude and participants’ explicit attitude ratings, r(32) = -.02, as can be seen in Figure 
1. 
Figure 1: Simple least squares regression lines for D-scores as a function of conscious report 
validity and as a function of explicit attitude rating (n = 34). 
 
Further to the central question regarding participant awareness of their implicit environmental 
attitudes measured by IAT, a thorough analysis of the conscious reports first required a metric 
by which conscious features of the categorization task could be validated against what actually 
happened during test. More than accuracy, report validity indexes the degree of correct 
awareness. That is, for the analysis of awareness the actual IAT served as the benchmark for 
what should be contents in participants’ awareness, to the extent they are aware of them and 
according to the theoretically intended task demands. Furthermore, because we obtained 
conscious reports constrained to identify participant awareness of task-related events, and 
because the conscious reports took place at random interruption points identifiable in the trial-
by-trial data, the analytic technique provided the necessary validation of conscious reports for 
the present critical evaluation of the environmental IAT’s adequacy. Accordingly, reports of 
hesitancy in awareness were validated by reliable positive correlation between participants’ 
hesitancy ratings and their reaction times for the trial in question, r(32) = .41, p < .01, clearly 
demonstrating that during the IAT these participants became aware of the influence of their 
own environment-related associations on their trial-by-trial response times. 
 
Conscious reports of trial difficulty provided for the IAT evaluation a manipulated variable 
that should not be in awareness during a test of unconscious cognitions. The correspondence 
between the reported number of difficult trials and the number of trials that should have been 
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slow by experimental manipulation, served as the report validity. For example, if there were 
a report of four difficult trials over the last 10 where the data record revealed five of those 
trials were manipulated to be difficult, then the report validity score was assigned a scaled 
value of .80 for the conscious recognition of 80 percent of those trials. Task difficulty in 
awareness for trials presenting weakly associated exemplar images was confirmed by the 
report validity sample mean, .68 (SE = .15), and by significant positive correlation between 
the number of difficult trials reported and the number of difficult trials determined by actual 
task demands, r(32) = .72, p < .001. The validities of reported trial difficulty, however, did 
not show a relationship with ratings of explicit attitude. Thus, it appears there was no 
connection in this sample between participants’ preference for sustainable living and their 
awareness of this particular behavioral influence of IAT trials. Nevertheless, in their written 
responses to open-ended questions a total of 28 participants (82.4 percent) correctly attributed 
difficult trials to mismatching categories or the mixing of labels. And finally, with a validity 
score for each participant’s conscious report of IAT difficulty, our systematic assessment of 
awareness also made possible an analysis of the predictability of those report validities. 
Implicit environmental attitudes measured by IAT scores were reliably predicted by the 
conscious report validities, r (32) = .54, p < .001. As shown in Figure 1, higher D-scores 
(stronger pro-environment associations) corresponded with greater validity of task difficulty 




Reporting on their study of attitudes to the environment and visual targets on product labels, 
Beattie and McGuire (2012) argued that the attitudes controlling our environmentally 
sustainable behavior “may not even be available to introspection and may be represented 
unconsciously in the brain” (p. 318). Such claims of unconscious representation are 
commonplace because they follow the cognitive theoretical tradition of dual processes (Evans, 
2008; Kihlstrom, 1999; Wilson, et al., 2000) that assumes two kinds of mental representation 
in separate cognitive systems, one explicit and the other implicit (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). The usual dissociation of consciously explicit beliefs from the 
behavioral influence of attitudes outside of awareness (Garwonski & Bodehausen, 2006) is 
taken in support of the standard dual-processing cognitive model, and was repeated in the 
present data for environmental attitudes in particular. Nonetheless, as associations presumed to 
be unconscious mental representations, participants were surprisingly aware of the impact of 
their attitudes toward the environment as evoked during the test. Valid recognition of implicit 
attitudes accords with recent research questioning the IAT as a measure of purely implicit 
cognitions (Hahn, et al., 2014). Contrary to the assumptions underlying implicit association 
tests (Greenwald, et al., 1998), not only were participants greatly aware of the difficult 
categorisation trials, the validity of this awareness predicted their IAT scores, and the task 
difficulty was accurately attributed to incongruent category targets in free responses. From 
these critical results it appears the IAT is inadequate as a measure of environmental attitudes 
that are outside of awareness. 
 
To the degree participants were aware of the influence of their environment-related attitudes 
they could be said to have discriminated the IAT trials on the basis of events passing in their 
awareness. They could tell, over varying degrees of report validity, which trials took more time 
and why. The analytic technique began with an analysis of task-related stimulus features of 
which participants could become aware, making possible the construction of the directed 
conscious reports and their provision of quantifiable validity against real events. Collecting 
these constrained reports appears to be an effective method for achieving introspective access 
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to representations that should be mental representations unavailable to conscious awareness 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kihlstrom, 1987; Lewicki, et al., 1992; Wilson et al., 2000). One 
implication of using the awareness assessment technique is the potential discovery of predictive 
contents in awareness within other areas of implicit cognition. For example, constrained verbal 
reports of prime manipulations (e.g. Grecco, Robbins, Bartoli, & Wolffe, 2013; Shanks, et al., 
2013) may reveal contents in awareness that are related to primed facilitation (behavior) 
previously considered inaccessible to awareness.  
 
Another implication for sustainable development education is the ease with which introspective 
access to these associative attitudes toward the environment can be achieved. Accordingly, 
individuals who express preference for sustainable living but otherwise persist in choosing 
environmentally harmful products might receive training to recognise and respond to the 
resulting contents in awareness evoked by their own environment-related associations 
(Rudman, McLean, & Bunzl, 2013). Alternatively, simply learning to be mindful of one’s own 
hesitations when making product choices may assist in aligning those choices with the 
consumer’s explicit environmental beliefs and attitudes. In perhaps numerous ways, the 
analytic technique to awareness assessment may have applied value in the discovery of 
potential objects of our conscious awareness that would otherwise remain hidden, outside of 
awareness, and considered a function of the cognitive unconscious by theory. 
 
On evidence of the IAT’s prediction from the validity of conscious reports of trial difficulty, it 
may be said that the influence of environment-related associations evoked by IAT trials were 
available in awareness. For each participant their reported task awareness can be characterized 
as a symbolic mental representation of an event captured in conscious memory, in this case a 
representation of the duration of their responses intended by the logic of the IAT trials. An 
alternative interpretation to the standard dual-processing view of unconscious influence (e.g. 
Beattie & McGuire, 2015) is to posit that symbolic mental representation is a cognitive function 
exclusive to consciousness; what is not conscious are the complex associative relations that 
connect conscious mental episodes that cannot be mentally represented as objects of awareness 
in the first instance. In the present case, we might say implicit environmental attitudes are not 
unconscious representations of a mental type, i.e. becoming active in a separate mental system 
that operates automatically and outside of awareness. Instead they are the interrelations of 
environment-related associations themselves that, when activated, produce the logical IAT 
response times which can themselves become symbolically represented contents of 
consciousness available to introspective report. Further investigation of conscious accessibility 
from an analytic posture is necessary before the nuanced assumptions of alternative approaches 
to implicit cognition can be competitively tested. 
 
Methodologically, the present research and analytic technique limit what can be known of the 
nature of environmental attitudes because direct evidence of environment-related associations 
in awareness was not provided, only awareness of associative strength during task performance 
in terms of the behavioral impact consciously recognised. We believe our approach effectively 
probed sufficient contents in awareness for the purpose of IAT evaluation because, by scientific 
standards, an adequate measure of any hypothetical construct would never produce an 
awareness of the measure’s intention or its operational features that could confound test results. 
The awareness assessment technique also placed constraints (by design) on the conscious 
contents to be reported. Consequently, what remains are additional researchable questions 
regarding awareness of implicit attitudes such as whether categorisation of exemplar images of 
sustainability predicts subsequent IAT performance as Hahn, et al. (2014) found for social 
attitudes. As a first attempt at collecting conscious reports related to a measure of implicit 
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cognition, some latitude was taken in terms of the demands of the report and the timing of 
assessment interruptions. Participants were only invited to report on difficult trials in awareness, 
yet awareness of other features of the categorisation task might be examined such as rapid or 
flowing categorisations, recognition of particular stimuli associated with decision hesitancy or 
multiple errors, decreasing response times to the point of automaticity, emotional affectivity 
and emotionality of responses evoked by the exemplars, etc. In addition, random interruptions 
of the IAT may have interfered with its performance in ways that place the resulting scores in 
doubt. Additional research may require alternative schemes for collecting concurrent conscious 
reports. For example, the presentation of implicit test trials might be paced at fixed intervals 
and conscious elicited regarding participant awareness of keeping the pace and of missed trials 
counted as errors. Finally, as a critical evaluation of the implicit test, the present research did 
not include a performance measure external to the environmental IAT (e.g. visual fixation 
points, product purchases) to demonstrate under what conditions the hypothesized influence of 
implicit attitudes on sustainable behavior becomes available to consciousness. 
 
We began this critique by questioning the claim that attitudes toward the environment influence 
behavior outside of awareness. Examination of the IAT used to observe and measure these 
implicit attitudes produced valid conscious reports that would seem to be a challenge to the 
methodological assumption that the test operationalises attitudes that are unconscious. In their 
empirical report Beattie and McGuire (2015) observed, “Currently, despite the plethora of 
research on self-report attitudes to the environment we actually know very little about the 
nature of implicit attitudes in this important domain.” (p. 256). On the present finding that 
sampled behavioral influences of implicit attitudes were accessible in conscious awareness, we 
agree with this observation and add that psychology will continue to “know very little about 
the nature” of environmental attitudes whilst researchers continue to measure those 
hypothetical attitudes with versions of the IAT. In our evaluation of the implicit test, an 
analytical approach to awareness assessment was taken that may prove to be an effective tool 
for gaining introspective access to various implicit cognitions and to their influences on one’s 
own behavior. Whether the technique assists the scientific scrutiny of other implicit tests, the 
environmental attitudes examined in the present study were not implicit in the sense of 
operating outside of awareness. Before more claims are made to the unconscious influence of 
environmental attitudes, continuing research should contrast the present findings with an 
awareness analysis applied to other implicit tests. Rather than attempting to explain individual 
resistance to sustainable behavior as a dissociation of environmental attitudes from separate 
explicit and implicit mental systems, we suggest that an analysis of conscious awareness in 
ongoing investigations may provide the empirical basis for introspective procedures that 
promote environmental awareness, personal attitude mindfulness, and positive behavior 
change toward the environment. The psychological detection and analysis of environmental 
attitudes available to conscious awareness seems a good place to start. 
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